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Abstract
We develop a theory of a multinational corporation’s optimal mode of entry in a
new market. The foreign firm can choose between a licensing agreement, a wholly
owned subsidiary or shared control (joint venture). In an environment in which prop-
erty rights are insecure, opportunism is possible, and the identification of new business
opportunities is costly, we show that the relationship between the quality of the insti-
tutional environment and the mode of entry decision is non-monotonic. Licensing is
preferred if property rights are strictly enforced, while a joint venture is chosen when
property rights are poorly enforced. For intermediate situations, the better use of local
knowledge made possible by shared control under a joint venture works as a double
edged sword. On the one hand, it makes the monitoring activity of the multinational
more credible, on the other it offers insurance to both parties, potentially compromising
the incentives faced by the local partner.
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1 Introduction
Multinational corporations (MNC) play a key role in the globalization process and in many
sectors the activities of foreign subsidiaries far exceed the volume of trade between countries.1
While the bulk of Foreign Direct Investment still takes place between developed countries,2
the opening of new markets in emerging economies has increasingly induced global companies
to explore the possibilities offered by alliances – and in particular joint ventures and licensing
agreements – to adapt to new business environments. Anand and Khanna (2000) report
for instance that in 1999–2000 over 20000 new agreements of this type have been signed
world-wide. In China, one of the largest recipients of FDI in the past two decades, of
the 304,821 projects approved between 1979–1997, 183,015 were joint ventures with local
partners, amounting to 51% of the total value of FDI projects in the country (Bai, Tao, and
Wu (2004)).
Notwithstanding the practical importance of joint ventures, the study of this organiza-
tional form has not yet received the attention it deserves. In particular, in analyzing the
mode of entry choice, the (theoretical) literature in international trade has focused on the
tradeoff between licensing a blue print and establishing a wholly owned subsidiary abroad.3
Whenever joint ventures have been explicitly considered, they have been modeled as part-
nerships in which the parties simply share the project’s revenues.4 Empirically, the idea
that the parties of a joint venture share not only the revenues of the project but more fun-
damentally control rights finds instead strong support.5 Thus, an important gap exists in
our understanding of the mode of entry decision in a new market, that can be addressed
by explicitly modeling the role of the allocation of the authority over the implementation
1Barba Navaretti et al. (2004).
2See UNCTAD (2000).
3For a pioneering analysis of this choice in a model of reputation, see Horstmann and Markusen (1987).
The implications for growth of the host country’s incentives for licensing vis a vis the establishment of a
wholly owned subsidiary are instead studied by Glass and Saggi (2002). See also Antras (2005) and Antras
and Helpman (2004). Even in their comprehensive study of multinational firms, Barba Navaretti et al.
(2004) point out explicitly that ‘We do not address intermediate forms of internalization, like joint ventures’
(page 15).
4See for instance Nakamura and Xie (1998), Asiedu and Esfahani (2001), Mueller and Schnitzer (2006)
and Smarzynska Javorcik and Saggi (2004).
5For instance, in a survey of over 200 joint ventures established in China between 1986 and 1996 Bai,
Tao, and Wu (2004) find that for the 15 most important business decisions: ‘Overall,..., there is a high
degree of joint control... The degree of joint control is over 95% for decisions on change of corporate charter,
termination or dissolution of the venture, increase or transfer of registered capital, and merge with other
organizations.’ Similarly, in a recent study of a large sample of two–parents US based joint ventures Hauswald
and Hege (2003) find that over 71% of them are characterized by 50-50 ownership structures, implying that
joint control is prevalent for all the most important business decisions.
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of the project. At the same time, knowledge–based assets have been identified as the key
factors behind the decision of a firm to go multinational, and their protection as one of the
main determinants in the mode of entry decision (Dunning (1981), Markusen (2002)). This
idea has also found strong empirical support in a growing literature that has shown how
the institutional characteristics of the host country affect both the overall volumes of FDI
(Lee and Mansfield (1996) and Smarzynska Javorcik (2004)) and the mode of entry decision
(Smith (2001), McCalman (2004), and Smarzynska Javorcik and Wei (2002)).6 While several
theoretical models exist that study the effects of the institutional environment on flows of
foreign direct investment and on the tradeoffs between a contractual arrangement and the
establishment of a wholly owned subsidiary, little has been said as far as how joint ventures
can fare in an environment where property rights are imperfectly enforced.
The purpose of this paper is to fill this gap by focusing on the difference between formal
and real authority within an organization (Aghion and Tirole (1997)). To this end, we
develop a model where the MNC, having decided to serve a foreign market by means of
a local facility,7 can choose one of three possible modes of entry. First, it can decide to
license its product to a local partner and receive a payment in the form of a licensing fee.
Alternatively, it can establish a wholly owned subsidiary, building a new production facility
(greenfield investment) or acquiring an existing one. Finally, it can team up with a local
partner and create a joint venture, i.e. an alliance in which two parties jointly own/control an
investment project.8 The three modes of entry differ both in the allocation of formal property
rights and in the revenue sharing arrangements. While under a licensing agreement the local
partner retains the power to implement a business decision and is the residual claimant for all
the revenues of the project, with the creation of a wholly owned subsidiary the MNC keeps
control over the project, but shares its revenues with the local partner to align its incentives
with the MNC. If a joint venture is chosen, the revenues between the parties continue to be
shared, but more importantly control is also jointly exercised.
In our setting, we do not explicitly distinguish between horizontal and vertical relation-
6In particular, using firm level data on the governance structure adopted by major Hollywood studios,
McCalman (2004) uncovers an interesting non-linear relationship between the quality of the institutional
environment and the prevalence of complete control by the MNC. Looking instead at companies investing
in transition economies, Smarzynska Javorcik and Wei (2002) show that the ownership structure is shifted
towards joint ventures in countries with weaker institutions, even though technologically more advanced
sectors tend to see a prevalence of foreign owned subsidiaries.
7For the sake of simplicity we do not explicitly consider in this paper the choice of entering by simply
exporting to the foreign market.
8Of course, real live joint ventures often involve more than two partners, but we focus on this case here
to keep our analysis tractable.
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ships. More generally, we think of the multinational as supplying the relevant technology to
develop a product or the brand image needed for a successful marketing campaign. The local
partner, which we assume to be indispensable for the completion of the project no matter
which ownership structure has been chosen, makes instead available to the venture its supe-
rior knowledge of the host country market and identifies the opportunities for a profitable
investment. Our analysis considers two types of incentives: The ex-ante incentives faced by
the local partner in identifying an innovative project, and the ex-post incentives it receives
not to behave opportunistically. An opportunistic behavior in our framework is represented
by a welfare reducing violation of property rights, and the likelihood that such behavior will
emerge in equilibrium depends on both the host country institutional environment and on
the MNC’s knowledge of the host country market.
By making the local partner the residual claimant of the project’s profits, licensing en-
hances the ex ante incentives to identify viable opportunities. At the same time, by granting
the local partner control over the implementation of the project, this contractual form com-
promises the ex post incentives, allowing him to behave opportunistically without being
constrained in its actions. Retaining some control over the project, as occurs for both a
wholly owned subsidiary and a joint venture, will instead allow the MNC to monitor ex-post
the local partner. Since control by the MNC is accompanied by revenue sharing between the
parties, the ex-ante incentives of the local partner will instead be compromised.
Ex-post three possible outcomes can emerge. If the host country institutions are effective
in protecting property rights, and the MNC has a poor understanding of the local market, the
foreign firm will choose not to actively exercise its authority (i.e. veto) and will consequently
fail to ex-post discipline the local partner. Similarly, when the MNC’s understanding of the
host country’s market is good and the property rights enforcement is very poor, the MNC
will be overly active in exercising its control rights. As a result, once again the ex post
incentives of the local partner will be compromised. Both a wholly owned subsidiary and
a joint venture can achieve the desired disciplining effect for intermediate levels of property
rights enforcement and local knowledge available to the MNC. In this environment, the
joint venture has the advantage of assuring that better use is made of the partner’s local
knowledge, thus rendering the monitoring activity of the MNC more credible. At the same
time, the ability to fully exploit market information provides insurance to both parties, with
a potentially adverse effect on the incentives faced by the local partner.
Incorporating the ex ante behavior, i.e. the effort of the local partner to identify valuable
opportunities, licensing emerges as the dominant organizational arrangement when property
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rights enforcement is very good and the information gap for the MNC is substantial. If the
host country institutional environment is instead very unfavorable, the better use of local
information made possible by a joint venture renders it the most desirable mode of entry.
When the extent of property right enforcement and the local knowledge available to the MNC
are at intermediate levels, the choice between retaining complete control over the project or
sharing it with the local partner becomes less clear cut. More specifically, it will depend on
whether the enhanced monitoring credibility or the insurance effect resulting from the more
effective use of local information in a joint venture turn out to dominate.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Next, we lie out the model (section
2) and analyze the ex-post organizational choice in section 3. We study the ex-ante problem
and the optimal effort level spent by the local partner in identifying a valuable project in
section 4, while we consider the effects of changes in the share of the revenues occurring to
the two partners in section 5. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 The Model
A multinational corporation has decided to establish an operation in a foreign country. To
carry out the project, the company needs the services of a local partner and can choose
between three different modes of entry. It can propose a licensing deal, establish a wholly-
owned subsidiary, or create a joint venture. The three approaches can be distinguished based
on the party that controls/owns the venture. In the case of licensing, after paying a licensing
fee, the local partner owns the entity, while in the case of a wholly owned subsidiary the
MNC retains complete control. If a joint venture is instead chosen, the MNC shares control
over the implementation of the project with the local investor. We model the choice between
modes of entry as the result of a sequential game between the MNC and its local partner,
and we assume that both agents are risk neutral profit maximizers.
The game has three stages, illustrated in Figure 1. In the first stage, a mode of entry
is chosen in order to maximize the joint social surplus, with a lump sum transfer being
made between the two parties so as to insure that both are willing to participate in a given
mode of entry.9 In the second stage, the local partner attempts to identify an innovative
project. If it is not successful, the parties settle for a pre–defined plan, whose return for
9We will assume throughout the paper that lump sum transfers between the parties are feasible, i.e.
that there are no capital market imperfections. For simplicity, both parties outside options are set at zero.
Furthermore, we will not explicitly model how the tow parties bargain over the lump sum transfer, since this
will not affect the socially optimal mode of entry.
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Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 3
Mode of entry choice Project identification Project implementation
Time
Figure 1: Time line
simplicity is normalized to Πd = 0. If it is successful, the venture results in a higher social
return. The project is carried out in the third stage of the game and might involve an
attempt by the local partner to expropriate the multinational, a realistic possibility in many
developing countries where property rights are not perfectly enforced. The implementation
of the project depends upon the allocation of the ownership/control rights between the MNC
and the local partner.10
In addition to conferring veto rights to the MNC and the local partner, the ownership
structure also determines the share of the investment return to be assigned to the two
parties.11 In particular, if a licensing contract has been chosen, the return of the project
accrues in its entirety to the local partner, whereas the MNC receives a share βw of the
returns if it wholly owns the foreign subsidiary, and a share βj if it enters a joint venture
agreement.
We are now ready to examine more in detail the implementation stage, discussing first
the structure of the interaction in the licensing case, then in a wholly owned subsidiary and
finally in a joint venture.
2.1 Licensing
If an innovative project has been identified, the local partner can decide either to behave
honestly or to act opportunistically. In the first case, the MNC is not expropriated. In
the second case, the local partner is able to convert part of the investment return into a
private benefit, not to be shared with the MNC. If the local partner behaves honestly and
10We follow here Aghion and Tirole (1997) and define ownership as the formal entitlement to implement
a business decision.
11The allocation of returns between the two parties can be endogenized using the Grossman-Hart-Moore
framework (Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1990)). For instance, assume that the return
is not verifiable until a plan is finally selected and goes into implementation. At that time, the MNC and
the local partner can bargain for their share in the project, with the outside option for each other being
determined by the ownership rights as well as, in the case of a wholly-owned subsidiary, the specificity of
the local partner to the project.
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the innovative investment project is carried out, the return from the project is equal to Π.
If the local partner acts opportunistically the expected return from the project is instead
Π− λ(l − k) ≥ 0
where k > 0 represents the private benefits accruing to the local partner as a result of its
opportunistic behavior and l > 0 is the private cost imposed on the MNC. λ ∈ [0, 1] is
an environmental parameter, that can be thought of as representing the expropriation risk
faced by the MNC in the host country.12 We will assume also that l − k > 0, i.e. that an
opportunistic behavior is welfare–reducing.13 When a licensing agreement has been signed,
the MNC cannot exercise any control on the actual implementation of the project, and the
game ends.
2.2 Wholly owned subsidiary
In the implementation stage the local partner continues to move first, deciding whether to
behave honestly or opportunistically. The structure of the interaction in the implementation
stage is described in Figure 2. By retaining control, the MNC can now scrutinize or “monitor”
the plan proposed by the local partner and decide whether to approve (a) or veto (v) it.
With probability ρ, the MNC is able to identify the nature of the project, i.e., whether it
is honest or opportunistic, while with probability 1 − ρ, the MNC remains uninformed. If
the MNC decides to veto the plan proposed by the local partner, it will come up with an
alternative plan in order to protect itself from the possible expropriation. We assume that
in formulating its alternative project, the MNC is not as well-informed about the available
market opportunities as the local partner. As a result, the return generated by the revised
plan is a random variable pi with a probability distribution function F (pi, θ) with support
(−∞,Π]. To characterize the extent to which the MNC is aware of the foreign market
conditions, we assume that pi satisfies first order stochastic dominance, i.e. that
F (pi, θ) > F (pi, θ′) if and only if θ ≥ θ′
12For a different approach in modelling contractual enforcement, see Markusen (2001). In his framework,
an outside agent is paid a defection penalty by the defecting party, and that is used to proxy for the degree
of contract enforcement.
13A possible interpretation of this assumption is that an optimal patent regime is in place. For a paper
which considers also the case in which ‘expropriation’ might be welfare enhancing, see Mueller and Schnitzer
(2006).
6
Local Partner
MNC
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Opportunistic
a
v
a
v
1− ρ
ρ
Figure 2: The wholly owned subsidiary
The parameter θ captures the multinational’s understanding of the foreign market. This
might depend for instance on the company’s ability to tailor its products to the need of
the local consumers or on its competence in dealing with the foreign country’s institutional
arrangements and red tape. Broadly speaking, this parameter can be thought of as capturing
the cultural proximity between the MNC and the host country. Formally, the better is the
“local” knowledge available to the multinational (the higher is θ), the higher is the expected
payoff associated to the project Πw(θ) =
∫ Π
−∞ pidF (pi, θ) ≥ Π − (l − k) ≥ 0. Since the
MNC retains control in this case, it will be able to carry out its revision without further
intervention by the local producer.
2.3 Joint Venture
If a joint venture has been chosen as the mode of entry, the interaction takes the same form
as in the wholly owned subsidiary case, but any alternative project proposed by the MNC
is not automatically carried out, and needs instead to receive the local partner’s approval.
The game form is described in Figure 3.
We model the superior information available to the local partner by assuming that it
is perfectly informed about the realization of the random variable pi. If the return on the
project proposed by the multinational is not satisfactory, the local partner will exercise its
veto rights and prevent the implementation of the revision. In that case the two partners will
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Figure 3: The joint venture
settle for the predefined ‘default’ plan which is characterized by a return Πd = 0. At the same
time, if the revised project proposed by the MNC is instead approved by the local partner,
the corresponding expected payoff is Πj(θ) =
∫ Π
0
(pi)dF (pi, θ) ≥ Πw(θ) = ∫ Π−∞(pi)dF (pi, θ).
The payoffs of the MNC (uMNC) and of the local partner (uLP ) under the various modes of
entry are summarized in table 1.
3 Ex–post analysis
We are now ready to solve the game, and we proceed starting from the third stage and
moving backward. Throughout this and the next section, we will assume for simplicity that
the revenue share of the MNC is the same under both a wholly owned subsidiary and a joint
venture, i.e. that βj = βw. We will generalize the analysis by relaxing this assumption in
section 6 of the paper.
Consider first the case of licensing. If the local partner is able to identify an innovative
project, since it can exercise exclusive control over its implementation, it will always choose
to behave opportunistically. The corresponding ex post social surplus is given by
Πb = Π+ λ(k − l)
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Table 1: Payoff Structure
Mode of entry uMNC Local Partner uLP
Licensing
Honest 0 Π
Opportunistic -λ` Π+ λk
Wholly owned subsidiary
MNC approves
Honest βwΠ (1− βw)Π
Opportunistic βwΠ− λ` (1− βw)Π + λk
MNC vetoes βwΠw (1− βw)Πw
Joint Venture
MNC approves
Honest βjΠ (1− βj)Π
Opportunistic βjΠ− λ` (1− βj)Π + λk
MNC vetoes
LP approves βjΠj (1− βj)Πj
LP vetoes 0 0
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If the MNC has chosen instead to retain some control (exclusive or joint) over the foreign
operations, it will face a cost of intervening and vetoing the project proposed by the local
partner if an opportunistic behavior is observed. Let
∆i = Π− Πi
for i ∈ {j, w} represent the marginal cost of intervention by the multinational, i.e. the loss
in social surplus that is associated to the multinational vetoing the project proposed by the
local partner and implementing instead its own choice. Obviously, ∆w ≥ ∆j, as the expected
value of the project proposed by the multinational is higher under a joint venture than in
the wholly owned subsidiary case.
The foreign multinational will credibly veto the local partner’s proposal if and only if its
share of the marginal cost of intervention βi∆i is smaller than the benefit from intervention
λl, i.e. the loss that is avoided by retaining control. Alternatively, this condition can be
expressed as
λ ≥ λi1(θ) =
βi∆i(θ)
l
(1)
In other words, the local partner’s proposal will be blocked if and only if the expropriation
risk λ is high and/or its knowledge of the local market is sufficiently good (i.e. θ is high).
Suppose condition 1 holds. Anticipating the possibility that its proposal will be vetoed
and replaced with the MNC’s project choice, the domestic firm must decide whether to
behave opportunistically or honestly. It will act honestly if and only if
(1− βi)Π ≥ (1− ρ)[(1− βi)Π + λk] + ρ(1− βi)Πi(θ)
for i ∈ {j, w} i.e. if and only if the expected return from acting honestly is higher than the
sum of the expected payoff from acting dishonestly and not being caught, and the expected
payoff if the opportunistic behavior is uncovered and the foreign multinational implements
its own project. Alternatively, this condition can be rewritten as
ρ(1− βi)(∆i(θ)) ≥ λk(1− ρ)
suggesting that the local partner will act honestly if and only if the share of the expected
marginal cost of the multinational’s intervention it will have to bear is larger than its expected
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marginal benefit from cheating. This implies that
λ ≤ λi2 =
ρ(1− βi)∆i(θ)
k(1− ρ) (2)
Combining condition (1) and (2) we have:
λi1(θ) ≤ λ ≤ λi2(θ) (3)
Let I = {(λ, θ)|λi1(θ) ≤ λ ≤ λi2(θ)}, I ∈ {J,W} be the combination of values of the expro-
priation risk and the local knowledge of the MNC such that the local partner in equilibrium
is induced to behave honestly and the foreign company accepts the proposed project. Notice
that both the left hand side and the right hand side of equation 3 are decreasing functions
of θ. To guarantee that I is non empty, we need to make an additional assumption:
Assumption 1 l > kβ
i(1−ρ)
ρ(1−βi) , i ∈ {j, w}
We are now ready to state the following
Proposition 1 Suppose Assumption 1 holds. In equilibrium, if the MNC decides to retain
some control over its foreign operations through a wholly owned subsidiary (i=w) or through
a joint venture (i=j), the following holds:
a. If λ ≤ λi1, the local partner acts opportunistically, the MNC rubber stamps (RS) the
proposed project, and the social surplus equals S(RS) = Π− λ(l − k) (outcome RS).
b. If λi1 ≥ λ ≥ λi2 the local partner behaves honestly (H), the MNC vetoes an opportunistic
project whenever observed; and the social surplus equals S(H) = Π (outcome H).
c. If λ ≥ λi2 then the local partner chooses the opportunistic project, the MNC always vetoes
(V i) it; and the social surplus equals S(V i) = Πi (outcome V i).
Notice that the equilibrium described in Proposition 1 is unique. The reasoning is as
follows. If the local partner behaves honestly in equilibrium, then when the project type is
not observed the MNC must approve. This implies that the local partner has an incentive
to behave honestly if and only if the foreign MNC refuses to approve the proposed project
whenever it observes an opportunistic behavior. Therefore a honest project will be chosen
in equilibrium if and only if condition 3 holds. The remainder is routine.
Proposition 1 and Assumption 1 tell us that for an equilibrium to exist in which the
multinational is able to discipline the local partner and induce him to behave honestly, the
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multinational’s loss in case of opportunistic behavior has to be sufficiently high. The MNC
is more likely to be able to discipline its partner the better is its monitoring technology (i.e.
the higher is ρ/(1 − ρ)), the greater is the local partner’s stake in the project’s profits and
the smaller are the partner’s private gains from behaving opportunistically.
Next, we compare the ex-post outcomes under the various modes of entry if the intersec-
tion W ∩ J 6= ∅, i.e. under the assumption that
Assumption 2 β
w∆w
l
< ρ(1−β
j)∆j
k(1−ρ)
This assumption, guaranteeing that λw1 < λ
j
2, is satisfied in figure 4, where we have
illustrated the equilibria characterized in proposition 1, when the MNC retains some control
over the project either by establishing a wholly owned subsidiary or by creating a joint
venture. The set J , describing the combinations of θ and λ such that in a joint venture
the MNC is effectively able to discipline the local partner, lies between the bold lines. The
analogous region for the wholly owned subsidiary case, i.e. the setW , lies instead between the
light lines. To understand the shape of the two regions, notice for instance that condition
(1) defines, for both a joint venture and a wholly owned subsidiary, the combinations of
(λ, θ) such that the MNC is indifferent between rubber stamping an opportunistic project
proposed by the local partner or vetoing and replacing it with one of its own choice. The
locus is negatively sloped in the (λ, θ) space because as θ increases, the MNC has better local
knowledge at its disposal, and will become more aggressive in punishing the opportunistic
behavior of the local partner when it detects it. Only if the expropriation risk declines, it
will remain indifferent between rubber-stamping and vetoing the proposed project. A similar
argument can be made for the remaining loci, described by condition (2).
Figure 4 shows that if the expropriation risk is sufficiently low, and the knowledge avail-
able to the foreign MNC is sufficiently bad, in equilibrium the foreign MNC will always
passively endorse the project proposed by the local partner, which in turn always behaves
opportunistically. If the expropriation risk and the MNC familiarity with the local envi-
ronment are instead sufficiently high, the foreign multinational always vetoes the proposed
project, replacing it with its own choice. At the same time, the local partner responds by
acting opportunistically. Figure 4 also shows that a joint venture creates better incentives
for the local partner than a wholly owned subsidiary when the expropriation risk and the
market knowledge of the MNC are low. In a joint venture the local partner’s knowledge
of the market increases the expected value of the MNC’s own project, and in this sense it
provides an insurance against a potentially bad outcome from the MNC own project. The
12
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foreign firm always vetoes and
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Figure 4: Wholly-owned versus joint venture
very presence of this insurance effect helps making the monitoring activity of the MNC more
credible, thus improving the incentives faced by the local partner as compared to a wholly
owned subsidiary. On the other hand, when local knowledge and expropriation risk are
high, maintaining the exclusive control over the local partner’s proposed project provides
the local partner better incentives. In fact, the insurance provided by the local partner’s
knowledge of the market at the same time increases the local partner’s incentives to behave
opportunistically in the joint venture as compared to the wholly owned subsidiary.
Comparing the ex-post social surplus resulting from the different modes of entry, we can
establish
Proposition 2 Suppose Assumption 1 holds. The following holds:
a. All three modes of entry result in the same social surplus S(RS) = Π − λ(l − k) for
λ ∈ [0, λj1);
b. The joint venture dominates over the other modes of entry, and leads to a surplus S(H) =
Π for λ ∈ [λj1, λw1 ).
c. The wholly owned subsidiary and the joint venture give rise to the same surplus S(H) = Π
and dominate over a licensing agreement for λ ∈ [λw1 , λj2).
d. The wholly owned subsidiary dominates, leading to a surplus S(H) = Π for λ ∈ [λj2, λw2 ).
e. If λ ∈ [λw2 , 1] there exists a λ ≥ λw2 such that the joint venture dominates and the social
surplus is S(V j) = Πj.
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Figure 5: Ex post social surplus and expropriation risk
Proof. The argument for parts (a) through (d) is straightforward and follows from propo-
sition 1. To establish part (e), notice that if λ ∈ [λw2 , 1] a joint venture dominates a wholly
owned subsidiary since S(V j) = Πj > Πw = S(V w). Under licensing, the social surplus is
instead S(L) = Π + λ(k − l). Let λ∗ be such that S(L, λ) = S(V j). Then it can be easily
verified that if λ > λ, S(V j) > S(L). ¤
The intuition for the results outlined in proposition 2 is as follows. For values of λ
belonging to the region indicated sub (a), under both a joint venture and a wholly owned
subsidiary, the MNC rubber stamps the proposal of the local partner, who suggests an
opportunistic project as in the case of a licensing agreement. In the region indicated sub
(b), the joint venture implements the socially optimal contract, while under both licensing
and a wholly owned subsidiary the opportunistic project is carried out. In (c) both the
joint venture and the wholly owned subsidiary implement the socially optimal contract. In
region (d) a wholly owned subsidiary dominates because it implements the socially optimal
contract, while in the joint venture the MNC vetoes the opportunistic project proposed by
the local partner and implements its revision. Finally, in region (e), provided that the private
loss occurring to the MNC as the result of opportunistic behavior is large enough, the joint
venture dominates by making better usage of the information available to the local partner.
We represent the total surplus from the different ownership structures in figure 5, where
the picture is drawn for a given level of local knowledge θ. Similarly, figure 6 illustrates the
welfare level associated to the different modes of entry as a function of the knowledge of the
14
6-
.
.............................................................
θ
S
Sw
Sj
Sl
1
1: none dominates
2 3 24
2: joint ventures dominates
3: joint venture and wholly-owned dominate
4: wholly-owned dominates
Figure 6: Ex post social surplus and local knowledge
local market conditions available to the MNC, for a given level of institutional performance.
As it turns out, when the MNC’s understanding of the local market conditions is limited,
all modes of entry are associated to the same welfare level. In this situation, even if the
MNC has the possibility to discipline the local partner, it fails to do so and accepts whatever
project the local partner proposes. Whenever the local knowledge available to the MNC
increases, the MNC will discipline the local partner, inducing him to behave honestly. The
joint venture mode of entry, allowing the MNC to take better advantage of the local partner’s
information, is more effective than a wholly owned subsidiary for low levels of understanding
of the local market conditions. When, on the other hand, the MNC has very good knowledge
of the local market, the MNC becomes excessively pro-active in monitoring the local partner,
always vetoing its proposed project. As a result, the local partner will once again behave
opportunistically in equilibrium, and the social payoff is represented by Πif (θ) where i = j for
joint venture, and i = w for the wholly-owned subsidiary. When both in a joint venture and
a wholly owned subsidiary we are in the ‘always veto’ equilibrium, the joint venture turns out
to dominate the wholly owned subsidiary by making better use of the local knowledge. For
intermediate values of θ the establishment of a wholly owned subsidiary is instead socially
optimal, because it does not lead to excessive monitoring.
We are now ready to consider the second stage of the game, in which the local partner
determines the effort level to be supplied in the identification of a new project.
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4 Organization Choice: ex ante
In the second stage of the game, the local partner needs to exert an effort e ∈ {e, e} to
identify a good project, with e < e < 1. An effort level e induces a cost γe, where e can
be interpreted as the probability of success in the identification of an innovative project.
Ex-ante, the effort level e∗ chosen by the local partner solves
e∗ = argmax
e
e(uLP )− γe (4)
where uLP is the payoff obtained by the local partner in the implementation stage. It is
easy to show that if effort is sufficiently costly, the local partner will choose e only under
licensing. Let e(L), e(RS), e(H), e(V j), e(V w) be respectively the effort level chosen under
licensing, under rubber-stamping, when an honest behavior is implemented ex post, and
when the always veto behavior is carried out under a joint venture and under a wholly
owned subsidiary. To simplify our analysis we will make the following additional
Assumption 3 βiΠ > l and (1− βi)Π + k < γ < Π for i ∈ {j, w}
We can then establish the following
Lemma 1 If assumptions 1, 2 and 3 are satisfied, the following holds
a. e(L) = e
b. e(RS) = e(H) = e(V j) = e(V w) = e
Proof. To show that (a) holds, just notice that if γ < Π
e[Π + λk]− γe > e[Π + λk]− γe
To show that (b) holds, remember that if γ > (1− βi)Π + k for i ∈ {j, w},
e[(1− β)Π + λk]− γe > e[(1− β)Π + λk]− γe
so that e(RS) = e. As the local partner’s ex-post payoff is higher in the rubber stamping
equilibrium than in the honest and always veto equilibria, it follows that e(H) = e(V j) =
e(V w) = e. ¤
The intuition for the result is that, by making the local partner the residual claimant
to all the profits generated by the project, a licensing agreement provides the best ex ante
incentives, inducing the highest possible effort level.
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Before providing a characterization of the ex ante social surplus Sˆ associated to the
different modes of entry, notice that the level of social surplus under licensing, Sˆ(L) =
e[Π + λ(k − l)] − γe, is a decreasing function of λ. Finally, the following assumption will
allow us to keep our analysis tractable:
Assumption 4 βi > l
∆j
(e−e)
e
(Π−γ)l
(l−k) for i ∈ {j, w}
We are now ready to state
Proposition 3 Suppose assumptions 1, 2, 3 and 4 are satisfied. The following then holds:
a. If λ < λj1 and γ < Π+ (k − l) then licensing is the preferred mode of entry
b. If λj1 < λ < λ
w
1 then the joint venture dominates over the other modes of entry
c. If λw1 < λ < λ
j
2 a wholly owned subsidiary and a joint venture give rise to the same surplus
and dominate over a licensing agreement
d. If λj2 < λ < λ
w
2 , the wholly owned subsidiary dominates
e. If λ > λw2 there exists a λ
∗ ≥ λw2 such that a joint venture dominates.
Proof. To establish (a), from Lemma 1 we know that if (1 − β)Π + k < γ < Π, the
local partner will implement a high effort level only under a licensing deal. Thus, Sˆ(L) =
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e[Π + λ(k − l)] − γe, while Sˆ(RS) = e[Π + λ(k − l)] − γe and as long as γ < Π + (k − l),
Sˆ > SˆRS. To establish (b) notice first of all that from lemma 1, if the multinational retains
some control, the local partner exercises a low effort level. This implies that the social surplus
associated to a joint venture Sˆ(H) = eΠ− γe is larger than the one associated to a wholly
owned subsidiary Sˆ(RS) = e[Π + λ(k − l)] − γe since (k − l) < 0. Furthermore, as long as
assumption 4 is satisfied, and λj1 < λ < λ
w
1 , we have that λ > λ
j
1 >
(
e−e
e
)
(Π−γ)
(l−k) . Thus, we
need to compare Sˆ(L) = e[Π + λ(k − l)] − γe with Sˆ(H) = eΠ − γe and the result follows
immediately. (c) follows from proposition 2 and the discussion in part (b). To establish (d),
notice that if λj2 < λ < λ
w
2 licensing is welfare–dominated by the other two modes of entry
(see part b), and an honest contract is implemented only if the multinational establishes a
wholly owned subsidiary. Consider now part (e). If λ > λw2 , then if the MNC retains some
control over its foreign operations, an always veto equilibrium occurs and from lemma 1
the local partner will supply in both cases a low level of effort. Thus Sˆ(V j) > Sˆ(V w). To
establish whether a joint venture leads to higher social surplus than a licensing agreement,
we need to compare Sˆ(L) = e[Π+ λ(k− l)]− γe with Sˆ(V j) = eΠj − γe. As it can be easily
shown, if λ > e(Π−γ)−e(Π
j−γ)
(l−k) then Sˆ(V
j) > Sˆ(L). ¤
The characterization provided in proposition 3 is illustrated in figures 7 and 8. In the
former, we show how social surplus is affected by changes in the expropriation risk for a
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given level of local knowledge available to the MNC. In the latter, we consider instead the
behavior of social surplus as a function of the information gap suffered by the multinational,
for a given level of the expropriation risk. As we can see, the main difference between the
discussion in this section and in the previous is represented by the fact that, once the ex
ante incentives are take into account, licensing turns out to be the strictly preferred mode of
entry when the expropriation risk is low and the information available to the multinational is
limited. The main reason behind this result is that making the licensee the residual claimant
to the revenues of the project maximizes its incentives. This effect more than offsets the
social loss generated by the opportunistic behavior it follows in the final stage of the game
when the MNC cannot exercise any control over its actions.
5 Changing the Revenue share
Up to this point we have assumed that the revenue shares of the two partners are the same
both if the MNC retains exclusive control over the project, as well as if control is shared with
the local partner. This has allowed us to focus our analysis on the role of the institutional
environment and of the availability of local knowledge in shaping the optimal mode of entry
decision.
In reality, corporations are often characterized by complex equity structures, and the
relationship between nominal control over the project and the share of profits accruing to
the controlling party is far from obvious.14 One the one hand, it is often the case that if
one party retains nominal control, it also enjoys a larger fraction of the profits than if it
shares control with a partner, as in the case of a joint venture. At the same time, the reverse
can also be true. In other words, we can think of settings in which sharing control over
the project might actually allow the multinational corporation to effectively retain a higher
share of the profits than in a wholly owned subsidiary.15 In this section, without analyzing
in detail the source of the bargaining power of the two partners, we will carry out several
comparative statics exercises to assess the effect of a change in the MNC ownership share
14Bai, Tao, and Wu (2004) provide a very illuminating description of how joint control is often a feature
of joint venture in which the equity shares are highly asymmetric. For instance, they show that voting rules
that require super-majorities are often specified in joint venture contracts. In particular, in their sample of
200 joint venture projects, unanimity was required in over 95% of the firms for decisions concerning changes
in the corporate charter, the termination or dissolution of the venture, merger with other organizations etc.
Two thirds majority were required in 35% of the cases for the approval of important management reports,
budget and profits allocation etc. In their sample in less than 25% of the cases the equity shares were 50-50.
15This could well be the case if a low profit share were to encourage an opportunistic by the local partner.
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on the optimal mode of entry decision. Our discussion will focus on the ex–post analysis, as
the ex-ante results follow from there.
First of all, notice that an increase in βi, for i ∈ {j, w} will increase λi1 and reduce
λi2, for i ∈ {j, w}. This means that, with a larger claim in the firm, the MNC also has
a bigger share in the negative consequence of intervening (as its actions tends to reduce
profits by ∆i, i ∈ {j, w}), and hence becomes more reluctant in exercising its veto power (i.e.
λi1 becomes larger). At the same time, with a smaller claim in the firm, the local partner
becomes less concerned about the negative consequences of a possible MNC intervention and
therefore becomes more keen to behave opportunistically (i.e. λi2 becomes smaller). In other
words, if the MNC revenue share becomes larger, the MNC will be more likely to rubber
stamp the local partner’s proposal when property rights are well enforced, i.e., when λ is
low, as the interval [0, λi1] expends. At the same time, the MNC will become more likely to
intervene when the property rights are poorly protected, i.e. when λ is high, as the interval
[λi2, 1] expands.
Our earlier analysis suggests that for intermediate levels of property rights enforcement,
retaining some control over the project dominates licensing because this allows the multina-
tional to discipline the local partner and induce him to behave honestly. The key effect of
a variation in the revenue share of the MNC in the project is to change its willingness to
discipline the local partner. In particular, if λ is small, an increase in the revenue share of
the MNC when it retains some control over the project will make its monitoring activities
less aggressive and as a result, it reduces the appeal of retaining control over transferring it
to the local partner through licensing. Comparing a wholly owned subsidiary arrangement
with a joint venture, if the ownership share of the MNC is higher (lower) in the former
than in the latter, a wholly owned subsidiary becomes less (more) attractive than a joint
venture. Similarly, if the expropriation risk is sufficiently high (λ is large) and the MNC
retains control, an increase in the revenue share of the MNC reduces the appeal of a wholly
owned subsidiary or a joint venture compared to licensing. Furthermore, if the ownership
share is higher (lower) under a wholly owned subsidiary than under a joint venture, retaining
complete control will become less (more) desirable than sharing it with the local partner.
What have we learned from these exercises? Our discussion suggests that while retaining
control over the project is crucial for the MNC to be able to discipline the local partner, from
the point of view of social surplus, the best possible outcome is the one in which the MNC
retains the minimum possible share ownership sufficient to retain control. An ownership
share that is too high is bad for incentives, as it will make it more likely for the local partner
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to behave opportunistically and reduce the overall return to the project.
6 Conclusions
In this paper we have developed a simple model to study the mode of entry decision by a
foreign multinational in a new market. In our analysis, entry can take either the form of
a contractual arrangement or involve the multinational retaining ownership of the project
either through a wholly owned subsidiary or a joint venture. A licensing arrangement gives
the best ex–ante incentives to the local partner but, by relinquishing control over the project,
the multinational encourages opportunistic behavior. Retaining control either exclusively
or jointly with the local partner worsens instead the local partner’s ex ante incentives, but
attributes the multinational a veto right to retain final say in the implementation of any given
project proposed by the local partner, and thus helps disciplining opportunistic behavior.
We have shown that in an environment where property rights are insecure, opportunism
is possible and the multinational enterprise has imperfect knowledge of the local market,
the relationship between the quality of the institutional environment and the mode of entry
decision is non–monotonic. In particular, we have shown that licensing is preferred when
property rights are strictly enforced, while a joint venture is the most desirable mode of entry
when property rights are poorly protected. In intermediate situations, the better use of local
knowledge made possible by shared control under a joint venture arrangement works as a
double edged sword. On the one hand, it makes the monitoring activity by the multinational
more credible. On the other, by offering insurance to both parties, it has the potential to
compromise the incentives faced by the local partner, allowing more scope for opportunistic
behavior.
The analysis we have carried out in the paper could be extended in several directions.
From a theoretical perspective, we have considered a framework in which the local partner has
perfect information on the technology available to the multinational. In reality, this is often
not the case as projects can vary substantially in their complexity. For this reason, it might
be interesting to generalize the model and allow for this additional source of uncertainty. This
extension might allow us to provide a better understanding of the cross industry variation
in the mode of entry decision.
From an empirical perspective, the model could be brought to the data using information
on the mode of entry choice, the quality of the host country institutional environment and
the proximity between the multinational’s home market and foreign destination. While these
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are all important questions, we leave them for further research.
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